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Abstract: This paper situates H. Morgenthau’s thought in the context of post-
foundationalist theorisations of the difference between politics and the political. 
In doing so, it shows how Morgenthau’s sophisticated realism refused to 
circumscribe the antagonistic dimension of politics and introduced the study of 
international politics as a struggle with negativity, temporality and contingency 
in the wake of the crisis of foundationalism in late modernity. Morgenthau’s 
tarrying with the negative is primarily revealed in his irresolvable tragic 
oscillation between Nietzschean skepticism and Kantian moralism. Nevertheless, 
due to its antinomic premises, Morgenthau’s tragic vision of politics can still be 
viewed as stopping a step shorter of its full-blown critical potential. It is not the 
purpose of this paper, however, to award or withhold credentials of criticality 
but to recast Morgenthau’s theory of the political as an instructive attempt to a 
post-foundational political ontology. This may, eventually, serve a purpose far 
broader than restoring classical realism’s latent reflexivity; it may prompt an 
argument about the conditions and challenges involved in practicing 
international theory as a constant critique of depoliticisation. 
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Introduction 
 
In an insightful article on the question of foundations in International 
Relations (IR), Marc Doucet argued that not only mainstream but even critical 
contributions to IR theory are predicated on a foundationalist bias which, 
ultimately, leads to the eclipse of the political from the relevant debates.1 
Recently, Milja Kurki put forward a similar plea for an open recognition of the 
political nature of meta-theoretical debates in the field.2 Both Doucet and Kurki, 
among others, touch on an extremely sensitive issue regarding the nature and 
legitimacy of critical theorising in International Relations; one that is inextricably 
linked to the ontological claims IR theorists make not only about their subject 
matter but also about the nature of theory itself and, if one accepts the 
interlacing of theory and practice, the normative underpinnings of political 
                                                 
*I would like to thank Beate Jahn, Douglas Bulloch, Sean Molloy, Felix Berenskoetter, Andrew 
Neal, Ilias Papagiannopoulos and three anonymous reviewers for reading and commenting on 
previous drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 Mark Doucet, ‘Standing Nowhere(?): Navigating the Third Route on the Question of Foundation 
in International Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 28, no. 2, (1999): 289-310. 
2 Milja Kurki, ‘The Politics of the Philosophy of Science’, International Theory, 1, no. 3, (2009): 
440-454 
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action as well.3 In the aftermath of the post-positivist critique, foundationalism –
the claim that there are unshakable grounds for judging between rival 
philosophical, epistemological or praxeological standpoints- is either discredited 
or becoming increasingly difficult to justify. Foundationalism is arguably losing 
ground and credibility; yet, the terrifying spectre of relativism or practical 
irrelevance that a complete surrender to anti-foundationalism would entail 
spawns the development of a middle-ground accommodationism that would 
secure the possibility of knowledge or the ground for political action without 
falling back to dogmatic or uncritical positions. The burgeoning literature on the 
evils of rigid paradigmatic thinking in the discipline as opposed to the merits of 
an eclectic or pluralist sensibility is a testament to the growing anxiety the 
retreat of foundations is prompting among theoretical circles and the pragmatic 
responses it provokes.4 
A recent, widely discussed, attempt to advance this pragmatic mood calls 
for a strategy of bracketing foundationalist assumptions and embracing 
‘foundational prudence’.5 Since we cannot know which foundationalist claims 
may be ‘true’ the best we can do is to get on with our research while isolating any 
debilitating philosophy of science debates that cannot be authoritatively 
decided.6 However, this move still rests on an agnostic attitude towards possibly 
existing absolute foundations. In principle, it still allows for the possibility of any 
particular foundationalist claim being ‘correct’ or ‘real’ in some deep ontological 
or axiomatic sense even though that ‘knowledge’ is inaccessible to our cognitive 
capacities.7 What seems to produce the impasse here is not the search for self-
                                                 
3 One may rightfully claim here that these three types of foundationalist claims, i.e. ontological, 
epistemic and axiological, are analytically distinct and do not necessarily amount to the same 
thing. That said, this paper argues that all three kinds of foundationalism are necessarily 
interrelated and can be discussed as part of an inescapably political process, the symbolic 
ordering of society. Laying out the contours of such a political ontology will be the concern of the 
next section. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to the need to clarify this point.     
4 Entirely indicatively of what is becoming a growing meta-theoretical consensus, see David Lake, 
‘Why “isms” Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to 
Understanding and Progress’, International Studies Quarterly, 55, no. 2 (2011): 465-480; on 
eclecticism, see Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the 
Study of World Politics, (London and New York: Palgrave); and on pragmatism, see ‘Symposium: 
Kratochwil’s ‘Tartu Lecture’ and Its Critics’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 
10, no. 1, (2007) and ‘Special Issue: Pragmatism in International Relations’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, 31, no. 3, (2002).  
5 Nuno P. Monteiro & Keven G. Ruby, ‘IR and the False Promise of Philosophical Foundations’, 
International Theory, 1, no. 1, (2009): 15-48. 
6 For a similar but more nuanced pragmatic attempt to separate ‘philosophical ontologies’ 
(ontological claims that can be treated as a wager) from ‘scientific ontologies’ (methodological 
practices that govern scientific inquiry) see Patrick T. Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in 
International Relations: philosophy of science and its implications for the study of world politics , 
(Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2011).     
7 In that sense it is not a coincidence but actually a symptom of that specific understanding of 
foundations, not as necessarily contingent but as cognitively inaccessible, that some of the 
participants in the International Theory debate on foundations and the possibility of a post-
foundationalist IR ended up accusing each other of hidden or unconscious foundationalism. See, 
for example, how Jackson’s (p. 462) critique to Monteiro & Ruby is that the latter’s promise of 
‘foundational prudence’ is favourably skewed towards scientific realism and Monteiro & Ruby’s 
(p. 502) reply that Jackson’s criticisms rest on unacknowledged philosophical foundationalism 
privileging social constructivism (see Patrick T. Jackson, ‘A Faulty Solution to a False(ly 
characterised) Problem: a comment on Monteiro and Ruby’, International Theory, 1, no. 3, 
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grounding but the understanding of foundations as presence, as an ultimate 
ground of the political.8 Thus, eliminating the quest for foundations or 
suspending their absolute claim while accepting it as an ontological possibility 
won’t do the trick; what is needed, instead, is an alternative theorising of 
foundations that would build on the aporia of their own impossibility and 
necessity without resurrecting the spectres of ultimate foundations that bring 
closure to the political. That would, in turn, introduce the possibility of a post-
foundational politics faithful to the dialectical tension between continuity and 
change in (international) politics and, thus, programmatically open to the 
repoliticising possibilities inherent in social life.  
Against this backdrop, this paper reads Morgenthau’s sophisticated 
theory of the political against recent post-foundationalist theorisations of the 
difference between politics and the political. The primary purpose of this 
juxtaposition is not necessarily to partake in extending ‘reflexive realism’s’ initial 
scope9 by restoring the possibly unexplored critical credentials of its father-
figure10 or resurrecting theoretical missed opportunities.11 These tasks have 
already been taken up by revisionist scholars with a success that is indicative of 
the growing self-reflexivity in the field of IR and the disintegration of old 
disciplinary orthodoxies. Yet, while their ambition to ‘save’ realism from an 
impoverished repetition of scholarly dogma is refreshing and long-awaited, it by 
no means makes them immune to specific disciplinary agendas.12 In contrast, the 
main concern of this paper is not necessarily to add to the revisionist disciplinary 
scholarship on Morgenthau or classical realism but, instead, to recruit 
Morgenthau’s thought as a didactic example both for his achievements and 
shortcomings in theorising the political.13  
                                                                                                                                            
(2009): 455-465 and P. N. Monteiro & G. K. Ruby, ‘The Promise of Foundational Prudence: a 
response to our critics’, International Theory, 1, no. 3, (2009): 499-512). 
8
 Doucet, ‘Standing Nowhere(?)’, 293 
9 Brent J. Steele, ‘Eavesdropping on Honored Ghosts: From Classical to Reflexive Realism’, Journal 
of International Relations and Development, 10, (2007): 293. 
10 Michael Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Vibeke Schou Tjalve, Realist Strategies of 
Republican Peace: Niebuhr, Morgenthau and the politics of patriotic dissent, (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008); Murielle Cozette, ‘Reclaiming the critical dimension of realism: Hans J. 
Morgenthau on the ethics of scholarship’, Review of International Studies, 34, (2008): 5-27. 
11 William E. Scheuerman, Morgenthau: realism and beyond, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); 
William E. Scheuerman, ‘A Theoretical Missed Opportunity? Hans J. Morgenthau as Critical 
Realist’ in Duncan Bell ed., Political Thought and International Relations: variations on a realist 
theme, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
12 Darshan Vigneswaran & Joel Quirk, ‘Past Masters and Modern Inventions: Intellectual History 
as Critical Theory’, International Relations, 24, no. 2, (2010): 125. See also the bold claim recently 
put forward by Nicolas Guilhot, ‘One Discipline, Many Histories’ in N. Guilhot ed., The Invention of 
International Relations Theory, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 6-7, that the 
revisionist historiography on realism can be seen as the latest reincarnation of liberal 
sensibilities, ‘a new orthodoxy in the making’ by ‘unrepentant idealists’ providing ‘perfect 
justification for a policy of selective and limited interventionism’ to a declining empire. Guilhot’s 
claim may sound over-stretched but his point that rehabilitated realism should be situated within 
specific social, political and disciplinary contexts is well taken.    
13 In this respect, this paper treats Morgenthau’s work as an inspirational starting point and an 
appropriate ‘dialogical’ partner to readjust older insights to ‘present-day sensitivities, interests, 
and understandings’ (see Richard Ned Lebow, ‘Texts, Paradigms and Political Change’ in M. C. 
Williams ed., Realism Reconsidered: the legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 250-1). See also Brent J. Steele, ‘Context and 
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Such an exercise presupposes strong affinities between Morgenthau and 
critical historicist currents in social and political theory, but this would come as a 
surprise only to those who equate Morgenthau’s realism with stasis and 
conservatism. Indeed, this paper relates his conceptualisation of power with the 
historical juncture that prompted its emergence, i.e. the retreat of metaphysical 
certainty and epistemic foundationalism in the context of post-Nietzschean 
political philosophy. Indeed, it will be shown that Morgenthau emerges as an 
apparent candidate to discuss the crisis of foundationalism in (international) 
political thought and the paradox of its necessity and impossibility, not least 
because Morgenthau is one of those rare thinkers that offers no facile solution to, 
or redemption from, the existential anxiety caused by the absence of ultimate 
foundations in late modernity. That said, this paper will argue that, due to its 
antinomic premises, Morgenthau’s tragic vision of politics can still be viewed as 
stopping a step shorter of its full-blown critical potential. It is not the purpose of 
this paper, however, to award or withhold credentials of criticality but to recast 
Morgenthau’s theory of the political as a promising but inconclusive attempt 
towards a post-foundational political ontology in IR. This, eventually, may serve 
a purpose far broader than restoring classical realism’s latent reflexivity; it may 
alert us to the conditions and challenges involved in practicing international 
theory as a constant critique of depoliticisation. 
  
The impasse of foundationalism and the difference between politics and 
the political  
 
This section argues for a reconceptualisation of the problem of 
foundationalism to allow for a sustainably critical engagement with its political 
nature. If, as noted in the introduction, we cannot step out of the foundationalist 
discourse without reproducing the terms of our enslavement to it, we could 
undermine the conditions of our attachment to it from within. Instead of 
resurrecting the spectres of foundationalism by assuming the absence of any 
ground, a more successful option would involve denying the existence of an 
ultimate ground. This move would serve a double purpose: it would open the 
conceptual space to think the possibility of many grounds; yet, it would do so 
without reverting to some nihilistic postmodern caricature of pluralism 
according to which all solid foundations have melt into air and therefore 
meaning has lost its diacritic capacity.  
In his recent study of post-foundational political thought, Oliver Marchart 
puts forward a vision of political ontology that attempts to come to terms with 
such a sensibility.14 Drawing on a host of post-Heideggerian thinkers, such as 
Lefort, Badiou, Nancy and Laclau, he relates the retreat of foundationalism in late 
modernity to the distinction, made by many prominent Anglo-American and 
continental thinkers, between politics and the political.15 Marchart thinks we 
                                                                                                                                            
Appropriation: the risks, benefits and challenges of reinterpretive expression’, International 
Politics, advance online publication, 20 September 2013, doi:10.1057/ip.2013.40.   
14 Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: political difference in Nancy, Lefort, 
Badiou and Laclau, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
15 See, indicatively, Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. G. Schwab, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996[1932]); Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: continuity and 
innovation in western political thought, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004[1960]); 
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should treat this distinction as symptomatic of the crisis of foundationalism in 
late modernity. The post-foundationalist thinkers he systematises, however, do 
not deny the inescapability of the ground; their post-foundationalism only 
undermines the absolutisation of notions such as totality, universality, essence, 
and ground. In that sense, they consciously set themselves apart from vulgar 
forms of anti-foundationalism or postmodern relativism which tend to regress to 
a mirror image of the same totalising gesture of foundationalism. Ultimately, this 
kind of post-foundationalism does not seek to erase foundations, only to 
inaugurate an ethos of constant interrogation of metaphysical pretensions to 
foundations and weaken their ontological status.16  
Hence, a post-foundationalist political ontology17 of the sorts argued by 
Marchart would not deny that foundations still exist and perform their functional 
role but what has been achieved is the acknowledgement that their ontological 
status is necessarily contingent. As Marchart argues, the argument that the 
absence of an ultimate ground does not necessarily entail the elimination of the 
process of grounding can be traced back to Martin Heidegger’s conceptualisation 
of the ground as an abyss (‘Der Ab-grund ist Ab-grund’), that is, as a groundless 
ground.18 Heidegger does not understand the place of the absent ground as 
empty in the ordinary or commonsensical understanding of the term. Since the 
ground, for Heidegger, is necessarily abyssal, it is precisely by remaining empty -
by incessantly deferring its own fulfillment- that it remains always open, 
endlessly generating new possibilities of grounding. The two possibilities of 
ground and abyss have to be differentiated in some way but they can never be 
separated neatly as they ceaselessly contaminate each other. In that way, 
Heidegger allows for both the non-identity of the two terms that is generative of 
the process of grounding and the inseparable mutual entanglement of ground 
and abyss that accounts for the paradoxical effect of the same process of 
grounding/de-grounding.        
The generative matrix of this paradoxical effect, for Heidegger, is the 
difference between the ontological and the ontic level (ontological difference) as 
such. To ask the grounding question, for Heidegger, is to think through the 
                                                                                                                                            
Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: eight exercises in political thought, (New York: Viking 
Press, 1968); Philip Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy, Retreating the Political, trans. S. Sparks, 
(London: Routledge, 1997); Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, 
Democracy, Totalitarianism, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1986); Chantal Mouffe, On the Political, 
(New York: Routledge, 2005); Jenny Edkins, Post-structuralism and International Relations: 
Bringing the Political Back In, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Yannis Stavrakakis, Lacan and the 
Political, (London: Routledge, 1999); Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political, (New York: 
Routledge, 1996). 
16 Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought, 2; see also Beardsworth, Derrida and the 
Political, xiii, for a similar reference to a body of mainly French political philosophy that engages 
the question of the constitution of political community as a process of grounding that produces its 
own unsettling excess. 
17 As it will become clear from the subsequent analysis, the use of the term ‘ontology’ here is 
predicated on a Heideggerian re-articulation of ontology that challenges traditional metaphysics. 
In that sense, Heidegger’s thought could also be labelled pre-ontological as Heidegger himself 
puts it: ‘‘Being-ontological’ is not yet tantamount to ‘developing an ontology’. So if we should 
reserve the term ‘ontology’ for that theoretical inquiry which is explicitly devoted to the meaning 
of entities, then what we have in mind in speaking of Dasein’s ‘Being-ontological’ is to be 
designated as something ‘pre-ontological’’ (see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. 
Macquarrie & E. Robinson, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1978), 32). 
18 See Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought, 18-22. 
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problem of grounding under conditions of an abyssal ground and at the same 
time, to rethink the ontological difference from the perspective of difference qua 
difference. The play between being qua Being and beings should be thought not 
in terms of an ontic difference between the two but as the very happening (the 
unconcealment) of the difference between beings and being as difference. As a 
result, a space of freedom opens up whose very condition is the negativity, the 
emptiness, the very absence of ground on which it rests. As put by Oliver 
Marchart: 
 
The ontological level cannot be accessed immediately, for this would require 
envisaging it as a solid ground (as being). If it is to fulfill its function of 
grounding, however, the ground, as we have seen, is simultaneously an a-byss…it 
is precisely because we cannot access the ontological level directly that –if we 
want to approach it at all- we will have necessarily to pass through the ontic 
level, in order to ‘wave’ at something which will always escape our grasp 
because of the irremediable gap between the ontological and the ontic, 
beingness and beings, the ground and what is grounded.19    
                                 
The assumption of a ground which is present in its absence and visible only 
through the effects it produces eventually paves the way for the possibility of 
multiple groundings on the ontic level. In fact, the possibility for grounds in the 
plural is an effect of the impossibility of a present, singular ground (ground as 
abyss). If this is true, then the contingency of this process of grounding is not 
accidental but necessary.  
Against this backdrop, Marchart finds in post-foundational political 
thought the conceptual tools to theorise this experience of dislocation in politics 
that he calls the moment of the political as opposed to politics. The former 
designates the ‘moment of openness, of undecidability when the very structuring 
principle of society, the fundamental form of the social pact is called into 
question’ whereas the latter describes the positively determined outcome of that 
process, a ‘subsystem of social relations in interaction with other sub-systems’.20 
He goes even further to suggest that the concept of the political can also be seen 
as the constitutive way of talking about the fundamental contingency that 
conditions our engagement in the world,21 a sign of temporalisation that keeps 
open possible processes of politicisation which otherwise, in a society that 
imagines itself as based on firm and unshakable foundations, could not be 
envisaged. The difference as such between politics and the political also implies 
that any effort to cancel this gap or gloss it over by using ethical, political, 
juridical or economic arguments is nothing else but an attempt to hegemonise 
the social by ideologically displacing politics. When this happens, the absolute 
contingency and historicity of the political is either dismissed or forgotten in 
favour of the fixity of the social. This dialectics between political 
institution/destitution and social sedimentation is uniquely captured by Ernesto 
Laclau when he reminds us that sedimented social orders are not non-political 
                                                 
19 Ibid, 24. 
20 Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: enjoyment as a political factor, 2nd ed., (London 
and New York: Verso, 2002), 193. See also Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political; Edkins, Post-
structuralism and International Relations and Chantal Mouffe, On the Political, (London: 
Routledge, 2005) for an elaboration on this distinction. 
21 Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought, 58.  
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but political albeit in hibernation.22 That is, their original political roots -the 
grounding moment of institution that is called ‘the political’- have been forgotten 
or suppressed within the social but can be reactivated at any time through 
dislocation and antagonism.  
The ideological displacement of politics in which the radical implications 
of political difference can be disavowed may take many forms. More often than 
not, the focus of traditional political philosophy or what has been later called 
normative political theory has been the establishment or legitimation of a ‘good 
order’ that would render any form of conflict or antagonism irrelevant.23 Jacques 
Rancière has provided a description of different forms of depoliticisation within 
political thought. He describes them as ‘arch-politics’, ‘para-politics’ and ‘meta-
politics’.24 Slavoj Žižek adds two more, the concepts of ‘ultra-politics’ and of 
‘post-politics’ (derived from what Rancière calls ‘post-democracy’).25 For our 
purposes, the latter two concepts employed by Žižek designate what an 
ideological displacement of politics amounts to by way of either reducing the 
political to politics or hypostasising the political directly into politics. The former 
case signals the familiar post-political foreclosure of the ontological instance of 
antagonism. The very existence of constitutive contestation at the heart of the 
social is denied; society is imagined not as an impossible achievement but as a 
world without conflict, where consensus is already established (Rawlsian 
liberalism) or is to be established in the long run (deliberative democracy). In 
the case of ultra-politics, the political (as the ontological instance of antagonism) 
assumes full domination over politics. The political adversary is seen as an 
enemy to be destroyed by all means. Once more the difference between politics 
and the political collapses, this time on the side of the political which politics is 
supposed to enact in an immediate way. The ontological ground/abyss appears 
directly into the ontic realm with often catastrophic effects (total war, 
revolutionary terror).26 
Yet, the fact that everything is political does not mean that politics or the 
political reside in all beings in an immediate way. A world where social ontology 
would not be mediated by the political difference would equal either a world in 
which politics (in the ontic sense) has infiltrated all corners of the social or a 
world in which the political (in the ontological sense of antagonism) is fully 
enacted on the entire scale of the social. Yet, this latter possibility is a peculiar 
instance which nobody has ever witnessed. As we have already mentioned, the 
presence of the political as the ontological moment of society’s institution can 
only be inferred from the absence of a firm ground of society, from our 
experience of the incompletion of the realm of social beings. The moment of the 
political, when society confronts its own contingent origins and the necessity to 
institute temporary grounds, has always already come and does not stop existing 
as an endlessly lurking possibility; yet, nobody has ever seen the realm of the 
                                                 
22 Laclau,  New Reflections On the Revolution of Our Time 
23 Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political, (London: Verso, 1993). 
24 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: politics and philosophy, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999). 
25 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, (London and New 
York: Verso, 1999). 
26 See Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political, (London; New York: Verso, 1993) and Chantal 
Mouffe, On the Political, (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2005). 
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‘onto-political’ as such, except in the cracks and fissures of the social which 
politics is always trying to foreclose but constantly fails to do.27 Politics is 
incessantly trying to get hold of the political but we are each time painfully 
reminded that an unbridgeable chasm separates the two. It is exactly the 
irresolvability of this gap that makes politics the name for a paradoxical 
enterprise which is both impossible and inevitable -which is why none has ever 
witnessed ‘pure politics’ either. The political cannot be brought about 
voluntaristically but, whenever we act, it is as if we always activate it or, better, 
we are always enacted by it.28 
This is why every displacement of politics –whether it contains the 
foreclosure of society’s ungroundable nature by collapsing the political into 
politics or politics into the political- is a manifestation of the political in itself. 
The denegation of society’s groundless nature may occur either in a 
foundationalist or an anti-foundationalist way; either by affirming an ultimate 
ground or denying the possibility of grounding altogether and transposing the 
necessity of contingency from the realm of the political into that of politics; in 
other words, hypostasising the onto-political in an immediate way. Both gestures 
end up abolishing the political difference and ultimately result in an ideological 
displacement of politics. Morgenthau’s intellectual genius and integrity consists 
in both recognising those forces at play in the political and refusing to gloss over 
the logic of antagonism that permeates international politics. In the next section, 
I will argue that by equally shunning a facile surrender either to the immanence 
of power (ultra-politics) or to the technologisation of politics (post-politics), 
Morgenthau’s theory of the political strove to maintain fidelity to the logic of 
political difference as such.  
                      
‘Lifting the veil of anonymity’: Morgenthau’s theory of the political as 
critique of depoliticisation 
 
It is often argued that the difficulty in comprehending Morgenthau’s view 
of the political lies in the apparent contradiction between his Nietzschean radical 
skepticism and his Weberian ideal-type categorisations.29 On the one hand, he 
seems to subscribe to Nietzsche’s primary diagnosis of modernity after the 
‘death of God’ interpreted as the disintegration of an international moral realm 
‘composed of Christian cosmopolitan and humanitarian elements’.30 In fact, for 
Morgenthau, disenchantment is not exclusively a moral crisis but a crisis of 
epistemic orientation as well. The ability to rationally discover a strong, singular 
meaning of the world -an ultimate foundation- is irretrievably lost and men must 
learn to ‘meet under an empty sky from which the gods have departed’.31 It is 
worth noting that this situation is not necessarily a deplorable state of affairs, for 
                                                 
27 Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought , 174. 
28 See Marc De Kesel, ‘Act Without Denial: Slavoj Žižek on Totalitarianism, Revolution and 
Political Act’, Studies in East European Thought, 56, (2004): 299-334. 
29 Sean Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 76; see also H-K. Pichler, ‘The godfather of ‘truth’: Max Weber and 
Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau’s theory of power politics’, Review of International Studies, 24, 
(1998): 185-200.  
30 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th Edition (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 244. 
31 Ibid, 249. 
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Morgenthau, as the ensuing indeterminacy and uncertainty may be seen as an 
opportunity for man to rediscover and re-employ his creative potentialities.32 On 
the other hand, however, he seems to evoke some kind of foundationalist 
sensibility when, in his six principles of political realism, he postulates that 
‘international politics like all politics is a struggle for power, and that ‘politics, 
like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in 
human nature’.33 How are we to interpret this apparent resort to determinism, 
this immediate closure imposed on an inherently open situation? First of all, is it 
really a closure dictated perhaps by the demands of writing a polemic34 -or 
perhaps a textbook35 - or does Morgenthau allude to something else? Has he seen 
the abyss of indeterminacy, suffered the vertigo and shirked from the 
devastating consequences of embracing nihilism or is there something deeper 
going on? 
Compounded by Morgenthau’s own ambiguity, interpretations on this 
issue abound. On the one hand, an array of serious critics have derided 
Morgenthau’s preoccupation with identifying the ‘objective laws’ of international 
politics as a concession to positivism36 or charged him with fetishisation of the 
national interest.37 On the other hand, scholars such as Murielle Cozette, Michael 
Williams and William Scheuerman, tend to see him more or less as a proto-
Critical theorist tragically misunderstood by his intellectual descendants as 
advocating a value-free international politics where power considerations reign 
supreme and moral aspirations are a costly luxury.38 Hence, Cozette portrays 
Morgenthau as a neglected critical scholar who was determined to speak truth to 
power ‘by permanently reminding Power that it lies when it pretends to embody 
Truth or Justice’.39 This is, admittedly, far from an unfair depiction since realism 
as a tool of unmasking moralism as a self-serving ideology has a long pedigree. 
Robert Cox and Richard Ashley were among the first to notice realism’s affinities 
with the hermeneutics of suspicion.40 This reluctance to take beautiful ideas at 
                                                 
32 Mihaela Neacsu, Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Politics: Disenchantment and Re-
Enchantment, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 53. 
33 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4. 
34 David Fromkin, ‘Remembering Hans Morgenthau’, World Policy Journal, 10, no. 3, (1993): 84. 
35 Jonathan Cristol, ‘Morgenthau vs. Morgenthau? “The Six Principles of Political Realism” in 
Context’, American Foreign Policy Interests, 31, no. 4, (2009): 238-244. 
36 Justin Rosenberg, ‘What’s the matter with realism’, Review of International Studies, 16, no.4, 
(1990): 285-303; Jim George, Discourse of Global Politics: a critical (re)introduction to 
international relations (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rinner, 1994); Martin Griffiths, Realism, Idealism 
and International Politics: a reinterpretation, (London; NY: Routledge, 1992); Martin Hollis & 
Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991). 
37 Veronique Pin-Fat, ‘The Metaphysics of the National Interest and the Mysticism of the Nation-
State: reading Hans J. Morgenthau’, Review of International Studies, 31, (2005): 217-236. 
38 Cozette, ‘Reclaiming the critical dimension of realism’; Michael Williams ed., Realism 
Reconsidered: the legacy of Hans Morgenthau in international relations, (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007); Michael Williams, The Realist Tradition; Michael Williams, ‘Why Ideas 
Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral 
Construction of Politics’, International Organization, 58, no. 4, (2004): 633-665; William E. 
Scheuerman, Morgenthau: realism and beyond; William E. Scheuerman, ‘A Theoretical Missed 
Opportunity?’. 
39 Cozette, ‘Reclaiming the critical dimension of realism’, 10. 
40 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10, no. 2, (1981): 126-155; Richard K. Ashley, 
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face value coupled with a commitment to unveiling the ideological use of such 
ideas as self-evident truths lies behind the critical function of what Guzzini calls 
‘anti-apparent realism’.41  
 Indeed, most of the new wave of interpretations of Morgenthau’s complex 
realism agree that not only can he not be readily dismissed as a thorough-going 
Machiavellian42 but that his outlook on politics share family resemblances with 
themes that have been traditional concerns of critical (international) political 
theory and normative IR.43 Williams invites us to discover the Morgenthau who 
grappled with the fundamental paradox of politics in modernity after Nietzsche. 
For Williams, Morgenthau sensed that, if after the dissolution of ultimate 
foundations a descent to relativistic nihilism and a vision of politics as the crude 
exercise of naked power were to be averted, the negation of power’s necessity 
would not do. Instead, a constructive engagement with its pervasiveness was 
urgently needed. Hence, his urge to view ‘the indeterminacy of politics as a 
potentially positive phenomenon, representing the possibility of change, and as a 
core principle of democracy’.44 Petersen goes even further in claiming that 
Morgenthau shouldn’t even be included among the contemporary realist gambit 
as his conception of the relationship between man and the world is far too 
complex to merit reduction to static views on human nature or pshychologism.45  
Most relevantly for our purposes, Scheuerman demonstrates how one of 
Morgenthau’s major works Scientific Man vs. Power Politics promotes an 
autonomous and specific understanding of politics according to which the special 
attributes of political action and public engagement should be defended against 
the depoliticising effects of modern modes of economic, social and 
administrative organisation.46 Following Weber, Morgenthau criticised the anti-
political contours of modern thought as well as the legalistic and rationalistic 
excesses of contemporary liberalism. In fact, since his early critique of legal 
positivism in Weimar Germany and his exhortations for a sociology of law,47 
Morgenthau was struck by the ‘general decay of political thinking in the Western 
world’ and the total neglect for the fundamental questions of human existence 
which he, following Carl Schmitt, attributed to the bleak obfuscation of the 
autonomy and specificity of the political imposed by modern scientism and 
liberalism.          
 In this respect, Morgenthau can be placed along the lines of a number of 
intellectuals deeply concerned with the eclipse of the political in modern liberal, 
                                                                                                                                            
‘Political Realism and Human Interests’, International Studies Quarterly, 25, no. 2, (1981): 204-
236. 
41 Stefano Guzzini, ‘The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations’, European 
Journal of International Relations, 10, no. 4, (2004): 553. 
42 See Benjamin Wong, ‘Hans Morgenthau’s Anti-Machiavellian Machiavellianism’, Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies, 29, no. 2, (2000): 389-409. 
43 Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests, Orders, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch, ‘Introduction’ in Hans J. 
Morgenthau, The Concept of The Political, trans. Maeva Vidal, (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2012), 22-32.  
44 Williams, The Realist Tradition, 116. 
45 See Ulrich-Enemark Petersen, ‘Breathing Nietzsche’s Air: New Reflections on Morgenthau’s 
Concepts of Power and Human Nature’, Alternatives, 24, no. 1, (1999): 83-118. 
46 Scheuerman, Morgenthau: realism and beyond, 44-45. 
47 See William E. Scheuerman, ‘Realism and the Left: the case of Hans J. Morgenthau’, Review of 
International Studies, 34, (2008): 29-51. 
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post-political, administrative societies. Morgenthau’s intellectual stance was 
triggered by the failure of Weimar Germany to avoid the double danger of either 
sliding into a complete disregard of the power realities of politics or embracing a 
totalitarian form of ‘pure politics’ utterly unrestrained by necessary normative 
limitations on political action. In the language of this paper, Morgenthau issued a 
warning against the swallowing up of the political either in the form of a post-
political, non-antagonistic liberalism with illusions of a harmonistic social and 
political order or in the guise of an ultra-political adoration of pure power 
politics most vividly witnessed in fascism and, post-World War II, in the politics 
of nuclear escalation.48         
This situation of social, political and, after the Great Depression, economic 
malaise was also described in different terms by E. H. Carr in his Twenty Years’ 
Crisis, but the two archetypical IR figures were not alone in observing these 
alarming tendencies nor were they the first to attribute them to the 
instrumentalisation of politics in the twentieth century.49 Carl Schmitt was 
among the first who noticed that political violence and extremism was not an 
effect of politics invading all levels of society but, paradoxically, a result of the 
retreat of politics and the loss of its specificity and relative autonomy. The 
challenge, for Schmitt, consisted in ‘discovering… specifically political categories’ 
and thus the identification of specific criteria that would enable the tracing of ‘all 
actions with a specifically political meaning’.50 His answer was the famous 
friend-enemy distinction that went beyond the ‘proceduralism’ of the market 
model instituted by liberal politics to reinstate an existential category of 
antagonism. This distinction constituting the ‘concept of the political’ is not a 
normative category within politics (in other words, it is not solely one social 
domain among others) but the concrete form of accounting for an autonomous 
identity of the field of politics that is acknowledged a privileged position by being 
‘the strongest and most intense of the distinctions and categorizations’.51 Thus, 
not only a relative autonomy and specificity but also a certain primacy has to be 
                                                 
48 Hans J. Morgenthau ‘Death in the Nuclear Age,’ Commentary, 32, (1961): 231-234. According to 
Fromkin, ‘Remembering Hans Morgenthau’, 86, the question of the progressive eclipse of political 
rationality consumed Morgenthau in his later years and prompted him to insert new paragraphs 
in his magnum opus, Politics Among Nations, suggesting the need for a theory of international 
misunderstanding, that is, a theory of irrational international politics or in his words ‘a kind of 
pathology of international politics’. 
49
 Nor the last, see Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. J. 
Cumming, (London: Verso, 1997[1947]). 
50 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 22-26. 
51 Ibid, 27. The laurels for this addition to Schmitt’s concept of the political to include the 
dimension of intensity belong to Morgenthau who in his 1929 doctoral dissertation, entitled Die 
internationale Rechtspflege: Ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen, had developed his own notion of the 
political in critical conversation with Schmitt as ‘a quality, a tone’ -not a substance- capable of 
infiltrating every aspect of international life (see Morgenthau, The Concept of the Political, 101-2). 
All this is well documented in William E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law, (Lanham, MD, 
Boulder, Oxford and New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 225-237 and Marti Koskenniemi, 
The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The rise and fall of international law 1870-1960, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 436 along with Schmitt’s reluctance to acknowledge 
Morgenthau’s contribution to the former’s revision of his concept of the political, hence the title 
of this section ‘lifting the veil of anonymity’. The importance of Morgenthau’s addition lies in the 
fact that the political assumes not only autonomy and specificity but primacy as well since any 
other social domain is nothing but political in the waiting or in the sleeping mode revealing its 
political nature when antagonism is intensified. 
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accorded to the political: ‘every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other 
antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group 
human beings according to friend and enemy’.52     
Schmitt’s purpose in making the friend/enemy distinction central to the 
political was to resist the domestication of political antagonism inherent in 
liberalism. For Schmitt, the primacy of the political is not a triumphant actuality 
but an endangered possibility, always at risk of becoming colonised by the ‘iron 
cage’ of a bureaucratised, technologised and depoliticised society.53 Morgenthau 
shared this Schmittian motif as his critique of scientism in Scientific Man vs. 
Power Politics amply exemplifies.54 Yet, while the two share the diagnostic part of 
the critique of liberalism and scientism, they crucially depart ways in the analysis 
of the origin of the fundamental antagonism that pervades the social. Schmitt 
eventually locates the roots of political intensity in the inherent evilness and 
aggressivity of human nature. Contrarily, Morgenthau believes that this is an 
impoverishment and distortion of the roots of political conflict which should be 
grounded on the complex interrelation of psychological and empirical factors 
rather than on the metaphysics of a fixed human nature.55  
 Indeed, Schmitt’s metaphysical reduction of the political to the friend/foe 
distinction, apart from striking as tautological and arbitrary,56 had radical 
implications that Morgenthau sought to avoid such as the romanticisation of an 
existential decisionism and the sublimation of brute force grounded on a 
pessimistic anthropology. To be sure, Morgenthau grounds his agonistic view of 
politics on ‘the lust for power which is common to all men’57 from which critics, 
perhaps understandably, infer that he endorses a metaphysical grounding of 
human motivation.  Morgenthau’s close association of human nature and political 
antagonism, however, may be ontological but is far from metaphysical. Petersen 
is a good guide here in disentangling this vexed issue. The lust for power in 
Morgenthau is not a metaphysical principle denoting some fixed human 
inclination towards conflictuality. Instead, ‘[i]t is a principle that transcends and 
thus dismantles the modern concept of self, and as such it takes us beyond 
motives and desires. In its most fundamental sense it is an attempt to explain 
how consciousness and reasoning are in themselves made possible.’58 
Morgenthau is effectively reminding us that human beings’ search for meaning in 
the world (the moment of self-consciousness) is born in struggle against an 
ontological horizon that precedes subjectivity, a horizon that has to be subdued 
to beget meaning but keeps coming back as a haunting spectre.  
Here Morgenthau’s all-encompassing conception of power and ontological 
understanding of politics come interestingly close to the anti-essentialist 
character of political difference. On the one hand, by defending the all-
                                                 
52 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 37. 
53 Carl Schmitt, ‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations’, Telos: A Quarterly Journal of 
Critical Thought, 96 (summer 1993): 138. 
54 Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1946) 
55 Morgenthau, The Concept of the Political, 99, where he insists that the political nature of things 
‘depends on circumstances of time and place and does not result from a ground of principle’. See 
also Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law, 239-40. 
56
 Morgenthau, The Concept of the Political, 108. 
57 Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, 5. 
58 Petersen, ‘Breathing Nietzsche’s Air’, 99. 
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pervasiveness of power –which, for Morgenthau and a long tradition of thought 
that harks back to Augustine, is the twin of a frustrated relationship of love-59 he 
describes the principle of antagonism that pervades social existence and 
accounts for both the destructive and the constructive potentialities of human 
agency. Politics without power is, for Morgenthau, unthinkable. But power, for 
him, is not a metaphysical abstraction derived out of a fixed view about human 
nature as inherently evil à la Schmitt; rather, it signifies the force of the political 
as the various forms, conflictual or irenic, human interaction takes in 
constructing different spatio-temporal configurations of the social.60 In this 
process, politics without the political becomes the deracinated administration of 
things. By adding to the Schmittian autonomy and specificity of the political the 
primacy of power as the ultimate reality and truth of international politics, 
Morgenthau institutes an understanding of the political as fidelity to 
antagonism61 expressed in the form of a tension between man’s inability to 
ground his own being in a post-Nietzschean world and the need to incessantly 
engage with meaning construction in a world that defies absolute grounding.  
Yet, the political (human beings’ power drive carrying both creative and 
destructive capacities) without politics (value conflicts over the authoritative 
ordering of the social) leads to a different kind of depoliticisation, that of politics 
without transcendence, or else, of surrendering oneself to the immanence of 
power.62 Employing the metaphor of tragedy, Morgenthau admits that humans 
cannot easily dispense with the search for ultimate foundations as a way of 
giving meaning to their existence despite the absolute futility of the task. Indeed, 
human beings, for Morgenthau, are tragic subjects because they are torn between 
the necessity and the impossibility of acting ethically. The language he uses to 
express this sensibility is that of a transcendent but no longer ‘objective’ morality 
that Petersen beautifully describes as a ‘Kantianism without redemption, a 
simultaneous projection of freedom and necessity that turns the latter’s ethical 
philosophy into an overarching antinomy whose continuous negotiation is the 
                                                 
59 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Love and Power’, Commentary, 33, (1962): 249. 
60
 See Felix Rösch, ‘The Human Condition of Politics: considering the legacy of Hans Morgenthau for 
international relations’, Journal of International Political Theory, 9, no.1, (2013): 1-21. 
61 ‘Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the 
ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political 
action. And it is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that tension (emphasis added)... by making it 
appear as if the stark facts of politics were morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the 
moral law less exacting than it actually is.’ (Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 10) 
62 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States’ The 
American Political Science Review, XLVI (December, 1952), 987: "To say that a political action has 
no moral purpose is absurd; for political action can be defined as an attempt to realize moral 
values through the medium of politics, that is, power.” Behr and Rösch, ‘Introduction’, 52-64 
make a distinction between Morgenthau’s empirical (pouvoir) and normative (puissance) 
conception of power. They correctly point out that Morgenthau’s distinction reflects his 
opposition to depoliticised forms of power that restrict the human creative capacity for building 
meaningful spatio-temporal articulations of the common good. See also Felix Rösch, ‘Pouvoir, 
puissance, and politics: Hans Morgenthau’s dualistic concept of power?’, Review of International 
Studies, 39, (2013). However, according to the logic of political difference expressed in this paper, 
Morgenthau’s animus dominandi is not strictly speaking ‘empirical’ as human beings’ power drive 
can be good or bad, creative or destructive. In that sense, a distinction relevant to this paper 
would be that of an ‘ideologised’ or ‘depoliticised’ (pouvoir) as opposed to a ‘critical’ or ‘reflexive’ 
(puissance) concept of power.         
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stuff of human life’.63 Human beings are both political and moral creatures and 
come up against circumstances where politics and morality make contradictory 
claims on them.64  
This part of Morgenthau’s legacy has been often interpreted as most 
promising as it refuses to gloss over the indeterminacy inherent in the operation 
of politics and succumb to a premature closure of the political.65 Petersen, for 
example, cites Morgenthau’s tragic sensibility as a corrective to those who have 
the tendency ‘to resort to rhetorical sleights of hand that amount to little more 
than statements of intent masquerading as solutions to an intractable, and in 
Morgenthau’s opinion probably insoluble, problem.’66 Whatever his personal 
predilections or moral convictions, Morgenthau refused to relax the tension 
between human beings as free moral agents and a less than perfect political 
reality, somehow always falling short of our best intentions.67 Moreover, his 
acceptance of the possibility of unintended consequences and his emphasis on 
concrete, standortgebunden68 analysis and the necessity of exercising prudence 
and judgement in moral dilemmas all attest to his constant struggle with the 
challenge of temporality, contingency and historicity. In his socio-political 
analysis, Morgenthau uses concepts such as ‘power’ and ‘interest’ as ideal types 
that indicate the possibility of making human conduct intelligible, and to an 
extent predictable, in a world that is in constant flux and marked by multiple 
contingencies, not least of which necessarily arise from the conflicting value 
choices various agents make.69  
                                                 
63 Petersen, ‘Breathing Nietzsche’s Air’, 107. Morgenthau displayed a characteristic reticence to 
close the gap between politics and morality. His scepticism does not necessarily deny the 
objectivity of values (which for him consist in a mix of Kantian and Judeo-Christian morality) but 
the possibility of grounding them in uncontested metaphysical moorings. The preservation of 
‘timeless ethical values’ becomes for him a prophetic task, the ‘moral mission of mindful human 
beings’ (see Christoph Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography, (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 176). 
64 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil’, Ethics, 56, no. 1, (1945): 1-18. 
65 See Williams, ‘Why Ideas Matter in International Relations’, 649 and Vibeke Schou Tjalve, 
‘Realism and the Politics of (Dis)Enchantment’ in Bell ed., Political Thought and International 
Relations, 183. For an argument that ‘grounds’ this indeterminacy on Morgenthau’s 
understanding of the self as constitutively incomplete, see Ty Solomon, ‘Human Nature and the 
Limits of the Self: Hans Morgenthau on Love and Power’, International Studies Review, 14, (2012), 
219-20.  
66 Petersen, ‘Breathing Nietzsche’s Air’, 111. 
67 Alistair H. J. Murray, ‘The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau’, The Review of Politics, 58, no. 1, 
(1996): 92, 97. 
68 The use of this term is influenced by Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge and designates 
the historically determined, and thus contingent, nature of all social and political thought. 
Morgenthau did not intend his realism to serve as a rigid epistemology, a supra-historical 
structure of explanation divorced from historical and practical exigencies (see his ‘The State of 
Political Science’, Dilemmas of Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). On the 
contrary, his emphasis on the normative dimension of action and his critique of the dangerous 
ideology of a particular historical constellation, that of the 19th and 20th century world of nation-
states, attests for his view of scholarship as an inevitable and on-going confrontation with 
temporality and contingency (see also Hartmut Behr & Amelia Heath, ‘Misreading in IR theory 
and Ideology Critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and Neo-realism’, Review of International Studies, 35, 
(2009): 336). 
69 See S. Turner, & G. Mazur, ‘Morgenthau as a Weberian Methodologist’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 15, no. 3, (2009): 477-504. For a view that Morgenthau’s idea of social 
scientific objectivity is more Nietzschean than Weberian, see Behr and Rösch, ‘Introduction’, 43.  
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In no way, however, does Morgenthau succumb to an understanding of 
those ideal types as corresponding to any deep essence or unified logic of reality, 
as he is often misunderstood by those who brand him a positivist. Morgenthau’s 
interplay between our understanding of the rational order of things and a 
recalcitrant reality remains a semeiotic,70 a distinctively hermeneutic exercise 
strikingly evoking the impossibility of the political to appear as such and the 
constantly displaced claim of politics to represent it. Equally, in his moral 
discourse Morgenthau insists on the necessary impurity of the moral act that 
produces a peculiar kind of political ethics with a critical edge. His ethics of 
lesser evil reflects uneasiness with moral intransigence or lack of concreteness in 
ethical judgement.71 In obvious homology with the necessarily mediated (but 
never reducible to politics) nature of the political, morality exists but never in 
isolation from its concrete political predicament.   
         
Beyond Morgenthau: post-foundational political ontology and the re-making of 
International Relations theory 
 
As we have already established, Morgenthau viewed political action as 
inherently contradictory, something that human beings are condemned to do 
since acting politically is a self-constituting activity through which they establish 
a meaningful interpretation of the world and of themselves but also an activity 
that is doomed to fail as it constantly falls short of the complexity of human 
existence, i.e. ‘the riddles of the world and of his existence on the other’.72 On the 
one hand, Morgenthau’s concept of the political resembling the Nietzschean Will-
to-Power is ‘not something that we have but much more profoundly, ‘something 
we are’, and politics thus not a choice but an inescapable premise’.73 On the other 
hand, nothing secures us from abusing our powers of self-making and turning 
the openness offered by the relativist struggle against certainty into an open 
invitation to indiscriminate violence or unprincipled politics.  
 Morgenthau, especially during his years in America,74 was conscious of 
the challenge presented and the opportunities offered by this Nietzschean 
vitalism and the ensuing scepticism. Accordingly, he identified the task lying 
ahead as how to strike the right balance ‘between the dangers of an end to 
politics on the one hand, and the hazards of rendering politics an absolute end in 
itself on the other’.75 Both contingencies represented what we came to identify in 
this paper as forms of depoliticisation, i.e. instances of the displacement of the 
political premised upon the suppression of the ontological dimension of 
antagonism. Morgenthau came to realise that a reactivation of the political would 
entail the recognition that politics is about engaging in constantly failed 
transcendental attempts to ground the social. His understanding of a democratic 
                                                 
70 James Der Derian, ‘A Reinterpretation of Realism: Genealogy, Semiology, Dromology’ in Der 
Derian, J. (ed.), International Theory: Critical Investigations, (London: Palgrave, 1995), 368. 
71 See Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil’, Ethics, 56, no. 1, (1945): 1-
18 and Sean Molloy, ‘Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil’, 
Journal of International Political Theory, 5, no. 1, (2009): 94-112. 
72 Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, 206-7. 
73 Tjalve, Realist Strategies, 100; see also Petersen, ‘Breathing Nietzsche’s Air’, 95. 
74 Murielle Cozette, ‘What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future of International Relations’, 
International Studies Review, 10, (2008): 670. 
75 Tjalve, Realist Strategies, 97. 
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community and the critical operation of transcendent ideas such as justice and 
morality in his work reflect his conviction that transcendent visions are 
necessary for human beings to unfold their potential.76 
Morgenthau’s thought here seems to attribute to transcendent ideals 
what in Ernesto Laclau’s post-Marxist analysis is described as the operation of 
‘empty signifiers’.77 Empty signifiers, for Laclau, are those signifiers which 
attempt to represent the absent fullness of a community. That is, they are those 
signifiers which embody the unity of a community which, nevertheless, cannot 
ever be fully achieved. Laclau argues that in a situation of radical dislocation of 
the social fabric in which a need for order arises, people prioritise the need for 
‘an order’ over its actual contents: ‘‘order’ as such has no content, because it 
exists only in the various forms in which it is actually realised’. However, in a 
situation of radical disorder ‘order’ is ‘present as that which is absent; it becomes 
an empty signifier, the signifier of that absence’.78 As a result, political forces may 
compete in their efforts to present their particular objectives as those which may 
carry out the task of filling the lack, thus engaging in ideological struggles over 
the filling out of such empty signifiers. This filling process operates through a 
double movement. It is a process that simultaneously signifies the need to 
constitute a unified representation of society, and the impossibility of ever doing 
so entirely.79 Similarly, in Morgenthau, that an ideal transcend us ultimately 
means that we shall not be able to achieve it. For societies to remain vital, they 
must ‘stimulate the construction of utopian imaginaries while simultaneously 
recognising that no person has definite access to the content of this’.80 This 
results in the ever-present possibility of recontestation and struggle over the 
particular objects that may take on this task, a task which is, in principle and in 
practice, impossible to fulfil.  
There are clear parallels between the function and role of the empty 
signifier and its particular fillers, and that of Morgenthau’s inspirational 
transcendent visions and their filling-out through democratic critique and 
contestation. Empty signifiers, like Morgenthau’s transcendental signifiers, 
ultimately have no signifieds. They signify a structural impossibility in 
signification as such, an impossibility that is shown only in the interruption or 
subversion of the sign. It suggests that in some instances ‘justice’ may come to 
represent the ‘pure being of the system’, a being which is constitutively 
unrealisable.81 We are thus dealing with an impossibility that can only ever be 
instantiated or ‘positivised’ approximately. Morgenthau expresses this idea in 
discriminating between a destructive moral nihilism and a healthy moral 
scepticism: 
 
[We are] not concerned here with debating the view that justice does not exist 
and is a mere illusion. Rather, we want to show that, even if assuming the reality 
                                                 
76 Tjalve, ‘Realism and the Politics of (Dis)Enchantment’, 184-191. 
77 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics’ in Emancipation(s), (London: 
Verso, 1996). 
78 Ibid, 44. 
79 Laclau’s emphasis on the impossibility of society and a fully constituted identity draws 
inspiration from the psychoanalytic and the deconstructive traditions; compare with Derrida, 
Writing and Difference, 278-93. 
80 Tjalve, Realist Strategies, 122. 
81 Laclau, ‘Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics’, 39. 
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of justice, we are not capable of realizing it. The two positions are by no means 
identical. They are no more identical than the atheist position denying the 
existence of God is identical with the view that man is incapable of knowing God, 
even if he does exist.82  
 
Despite its promise, however, the problem with this understanding of the 
relationship between transcendence and immanence is that it postulates an 
unbridgeable gap between the two aforementioned dimensions fuelling, in turn, 
a process of what Hegel called bad infinity. This is more than evident in 
Morgenthau’s wholesale embracement of the Pascalian sensibility that envisages 
human beings as always stranded between the inexorable determinism of nature 
and their ability to transcend finitude.83 In trying to tread a precarious path 
between avoiding the reification of either a politics of unending violence or of 
post-political ratiocination, Morgenthau’s ‘Kantianism without redemption’ 
remains trapped in the dialectics of bad conscience. That is, I can never be sure 
that I did the right thing or that I fully assumed my responsibility because, even if 
I manage to treat someone virtuously or justly, that will always happen at the 
expense of someone else, my family to the detriment of other families, a stranger 
to the detriment of other strangers. The programmatic impurity of the ethical act 
seems to be the fundamental requirement of a truly ethical decision. One, then, is 
still seized by the despairing ambivalence that something must necessarily 
escape us when making an ethico-political decision in the face of undecidability. 
Morgenthau, in a way reminiscent of Laclau’s formalism, seems to embrace a 
similar Kantian (as well as Pascalian and Sophoclean) –by way of reinscribing an 
antinomy between freedom and necessity- sense of the tragic.84 Morgenthau 
envisages a democratic community as the one in which everything turns around 
the possibility of keeping always open and ultimately undecided the moment of 
articulation between the universality of the normative order and the singularity 
of the ethical moment. Depoliticisation, however, is likely to emerge not only 
from misrecognising necessity and naturalness where there are only 
impermanent and contestable social arrangements but also from the temptation 
to view universality as an empty form always longing to be filled and a priori 
failing to achieve the reconciliation between a recalcitrant reality and our ethical 
ideals.85  
                                                 
82 Hans J. Morgenthau, Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade 1960-1970, New York, Washington, 
London: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 62-3. 
83 See Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, 223. 
84 See Lucien Goldmann, The Hidden God: a study of tragic vision in the Pensées of Pascal and the 
tragedies of Racine, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), 15, 48-9. Here there are more than 
structural similarities between Pascal’s wager, Kant’s antinomic thinking, Kierkegaard’s leap of 
faith and Morgenthau’s theorising under an empty sky where belief in morally transcendent 
principles is also an act of faith. The point here is not the obvious one, i.e. to place Morgenthau in 
the line of tragic thinkers that repeatedly failed to reconcile antinomic positions, but to argue that 
positioning oneself towards that failure (is it a source of despair or renewal?) makes all the 
difference. 
85 In this respect, Morgenthau’s reduction of unresolved antinomies to an anthropological 
transhistorical structure may then explain his lack of clarity in grounding his political ethics and 
the tendency of his realism to be equated with Heinrich Treitschke’s realpolitik. See here 
Morgenthau’s protestations that his work had been misunderstood and him taking the blame for 
it in a letter to Oakeshott, in Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, 204.  
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Ultimately, Morgenthau remains relevant for a critical investigation of 
depoliticisation in IR not so much in offering an understanding of the limitations 
surrounding human knowledge and action. Rather, it is because his post-
foundational articulation of the political as an unending dialectics of openness 
and closure enables the re-marking of the critical ‘groundless ground’ from which 
the same problems, the same challenges, the same impossible simultaneity of the 
transcendental and the empirical can be rethought and reproblematised for 
progressive purposes.86 His thought was pregnant with critical insights exactly 
because, whether he theorised on power, morality, politics or human nature, his 
pronouncements were marked by a fidelity to negativity and an appreciation of 
the spatio-temporal contingencies that make up social life. This is more than 
evident in his persistent refusal to naturalise historically conditioned structures 
as, for instance, in his discussion of the obsoleteness of the nation state and the 
possibility of a world-state in Politics Among Nations or in his vehement rejection 
of perfectionist ethics. In allowing for the possibility of transformation and 
resisting the reification of contingent institutions, Morgenthau was actually a 
true realist as there is nothing more real than change.87  
In these instances, international theory becomes the site in which IR 
scholars exercise not merely their dissident role but also employ their political 
imagination in the fray of everyday politics and collective engagement. In the 
absence of an undisputed ontological, epistemic or axiological foundation for 
their scholarly interventions, public relevance and scrutiny remains the ultimate 
litmus test of their critical interventions. Morgenthau himself was acutely aware 
of that critical aspect of international theory as the conscience of policy-makers 
and mankind in general.88 His commitment to a publicly relevant IR, often 
incurring a personal cost,89 is underpinned by a view of politics as a grounding 
exercise in the absence of an ultimate ground, a site where individual and 
collective value commitments clash or converge with no privileged access to 
truth. Much in line with the post-structuralist emphasis on the critical role of the 
intellectual, for Morgenthau, the political was the personal indeed. If, despite his 
vigilance, his strict separation of the realms of immanence and transcendence 
could crystallise into an implacable structure, that is symptomatic not only of the 
promising possibilities but also of the fragile nature and paradoxes surrounding 
the critical enterprise in IR.90  
                                                 
86 For instances of such an enterprise, see William Bain, ‘Deconfusing Morgenthau: moral inquiry 
and classical realism reconsidered’, Review of International Studies, 26, (2000): 445-464; William 
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Schuett, ‘Peace through Transformation? Political Realism and the Progressivism of National 
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Political Thought and International Relations, 10. 
88 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory’ in Der Derian ed., 
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89 For a summary account of the negative consequences Morgenthau’s dissident stance on 
Vietnam had on his career and reputation, see Rösch, ‘The Human Condition of Politics’, 12-13.   
90 See Vassilios Paipais, ‘Self and Other in Critical International Theory: Assimilation, 
Incommensurability and the Paradox of Critique’, Review of International Studies, 37, no. 1, 
(2011): 121-140 and Kimberly Hutchings, Kant, Critique and Politics, (New York: Routledge, 
1996). For criticisms that Morgenthau lacks a sustainable concept and practice of reflexivity that 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper engaged with the sophisticated realism of Hans J. Morgenthau 
and examined his theory of the political in conjunction with a post-
foundationalist theorisation of the difference between politics and the political. 
In doing so, it managed to show how Morgenthau’s double critique of 
depoliticisation refuses to circumscribe the element of antagonism pervading 
both the constitution and the conduct of politics. What became apparent from 
the critical revisiting of Morgenthau’s position is not some hidden objective truth 
or ‘verifiable’ reality that escaped him and which this paper claims access to 
from a neutral, disengaged position. Rather, in an authentic act of criticism, as 
Rex Butler remarks, we do not seek to oppose the other(s) but, instead, bring out 
a certain ‘internal contradiction’ to them, in a sense repeat all that they are 
saying but for an entirely different reason.91 If this is true, then any act of 
criticism is not in what is being said but in the saying, not so much in the content 
but in its form. The task of the critic in this case is not to dwell on errors or 
limitations but to highlight what is more in a thinker than he himself was able or 
willing to recognise. The purpose of this critique, then, is not to identify lacunae 
in Morgenthau’s arguments but to interrogate the ‘transcendental’ conditions of 
his discourse: that which is in it more than itself.92 It is this logic of heterogeneity 
that political difference stands for. 93 
Even Morgenthau’s failure to fully overcome the temptation of 
depoliticisation can prove useful for critical thought. His irresolvable oscillation 
between Nietzschean skepticism and quasi-Kantian moral transcendence is not 
necessarily conservative as long as one reads it not as another structural 
necessity but, rather, as the condition of possibility of historicity itself.94 The 
hidden progressive possibilities of Morgenthau’s double critique of 
depoliticisation are then revealed by a shifting of perspective because it is 
exactly ‘in thinking that there is no alternative to what is that some alternative is 
                                                                                                                                            
eventually compromises his ability to imagine new repoliticising possibilities, see Daniel Levine, 
Recovering International Relations: The Promise of Sustainable Critique, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 131-35 and Inanna Hamati-Ataya, ‘Knowing and Judging in International 
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91 Butler, Slavoj Žižek: live theory, 126. 
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93 For a similar argument that sees political realism as recognising the heterogeneity arising out 
of the dialectical nature of reality, see Griffiths, Realism, Idealism and International Politics; that 
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York: Verso, 2000), 108. 
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opened up’.95 All significant critical theory is this drive: incessantly encircling the 
impossibility of something existing ‘outside what is’ and in the very thinking of 
this the production of a certain ‘excess’ or ‘gap’.96 All critical theory then is a 
‘forced choice’, an exercise of freedom in necessity that produces its own excess 
and through this act of repetition new avenues of repoliticisation are broached. If 
International Relations theory is to join in this endeavour, then it must repeat 
everything that comes before it unchanged and its own image must be remade as 
post-foundational political ontology. Instead of inviting passivity or despair, the 
paradox of political difference may then become the condition of possibility for a 
constant re-politicisation of our political imaginary in critically constructing new 
modes of political and social organisation in global politics. 
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